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Abstract  
 
This article explores the extent to which efforts to improve productivity of smallholder 
agriculture through a new ‘Green Revolution’ in Sub Saharan Africa are likely to enhance 
the capacity of smallholder farmers to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Drawing on 
empirical material from Malawi and Kenya, the paper finds more trade offs than synergies 
between the pursuit of higher productivity through the promotion of hybrid maize adoption 
and crop diversification as a strategy for climate change adaptation. This is despite an oft-
assumed causal link between escape from the ‘low maize productivity trap’ and 
progression towards crop diversification as an adaptive strategy. In both countries, a 
convergence of interests between governments, donors and seed companies, combined 
with a historical preference for, and dependence on maize as the primary staple, has led to 
a narrowing of options for smallholder farmers, undermining the development of adaptive 
capacities fin the longer term. This narrowing of options is be linked to a conflation of 
market-based ‘variety’ of agricultural technologies, as seen ‘from the top down’ with 
‘diversity-in-context’ as represented by site-specific and locally derived and adapted 
technologies and institutions that can only be built on ‘from the bottom up’.  
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Introduction 
 
Food security is one of the main challenges facing countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). 
This has been highlighted by recent food crises and famines, notably the food crisis in the 
Horn of Africa in 2010-2011, resulting from the most severe drought to hit the region in 60 
years (Oxfam, 2012). Moreover, ‘the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates 
that 26 percent of Africa’s population is undernourished’ (Kimenyi et al., 2012:2). Factors 
contributing to the emergence of food crises and ‘new famines’ (Devereux, 1998) in the 
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region have been much debated, and include a combination of production, market and 
policy failures (Devereux, 2009). In addition, new competition from biofuels (Borras et al., 
2010) and speculation in food futures (Spratt, 2013, Ghosh, 2010) have exacerbated the 
growing instability of global food systems and their unpredictable, localised effects. In the 
midst of these new and old sources of food system instability, production remains an 
enduring concern, particularly in SSA (Devereux, 2009:26). While aggregate crop output in 
the region has been increasing in recent years ‘this has been driven by the expansion of 
cultivated land rather than productivity gains’ (Scoones and Thompson, 2011:2). 
Stagnation of crop yields is exacerbated by the impacts of climate change and variability. 
‘Current projections are that higher temperatures and lower rainfall in parts of Sub 
Saharan Africa combined with a doubling of the population, will lead to 43 per cent 
increase in food insecurity’ over the next twenty years (Scoones and Thompson, 2011:2).  
 
The impact of these uncertainties on smallholder farms has been the focus of intervention 
and analysis in recent years (Foresight, 2011, Vermeulen et al., 2012, Alarcon and 
Bodouroglou, 2011), since ‘the bulk of Sub Saharan Africa’s 33 million farms are both 
physically small - of less than two hectares of good arable land or its equivalent - and 
operated at the household level using mainly family labour’ (Scoones and Thompson, 
2011:1). Investment in the smallholder agriculture sector is therefore increasingly favoured 
by aid donors as a poverty reduction strategy, as well as an entry point for building 
adaptive capacity in the context of climate change (Vermeulen et al., 2012:128). The 
smallholder sector is far from homogenous, however, so ‘there is a particular call for 
research in climate, agriculture and food systems to address highly local contexts while 
also giving the requisite attention to wider-scale institutional mechanisms for spreading 
solutions, developing shared visions of the future and negotiating differential roles and 
responsibilities’ (Vermeulen et al., 2012:128, see also Thornton et al., 2011). This article 
reviews agricultural innovations in Malawi and Kenya promoted under the banner of a new 
‘Green Revolution’ and, following Vermeulen et al. (2012), considers whether they are 
likely to a) ‘address highly local contexts’ and b) support ‘appropriate institutional 
mechanisms, in ways that enable smallholder farmers to adapt to the effects of climate 
change’.  
 
Climate change ‘adaptation refers to actions taken to adjust to the consequences of 
climate change, either before or after impacts are experienced’ (Lemos et al., 2007:25); 
actions taken by State intervention or through activities of individuals, communities, NGOs 
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or private sector actors. Climate change and, increasingly also development communities 
focus on building adaptive capacity of some or all of these actors (IPCC, 2007, Lemos et 
al., 2007). Adaptive capacity has been defined as ‘the ability of a system to adjust to 
climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential 
damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences’ (Gallopin, 
2006:300). This capacity is not easy to identify and measure, however, since adaptive 
capacity is ‘a latent condition that can only be observed when realized through some form 
of concrete adaptation’ (Lemos et al., 2007:25). Furthermore, IPCC assessments of 
adaptive capacity in different national contexts tends to conflate domestic institutional 
capacity with measures of economic development such as GDP (Adger, 2006), thus 
underplaying the role of community-level adaptive capacity rooted in indigenous 
knowledge and experience of coping with climate variability; and embedded in informal 
networks and institutions. Nevertheless, a degree of consensus now exists that the 
creation of adaptive capacity is achievable though investment in a combination of 
knowledge production and dissemination, institutional development and material resources 
(Lemos et al., 2007:25). As Adger (2006) has observed, however, this discourse of 
consensus is surprising given that climate change is a ‘classic multi-scale problem’ (Adger, 
2006:273), in which cross-scale dynamics generate conflicts and tradeoffs as well as 
synergies (Adger et al., 2005). Such conflicts often remain latent, however, since more 
powerful actors are able to ‘tilt the playing field’, influencing the framing of problems and, 
consequently, conclusions as to the ‘appropriate’ scale of analysis (Adger et al., 2006).  
 
The idea of enablement is taken from ‘systems of innovation’ literature, which identifies an 
‘enabling environment’ (that is, policies and institutions that enable the development and 
use of particular technologies) as an essential component of a successful innovation 
system (Freeman, 1995, Edquist, 1997, World Bank, 2006). An agricultural innovation 
system (AIS) has been defined as ‘the set of agents (individuals, organizations and 
institutions) that contribute to the development, diffusion and use of new agricultural 
technologies, and that directly or indirectly influence the process of change in agriculture’ 
(Temel et al., 2003). The AIS framework represents a break with conventional, linear 
understandings of agricultural innovation (in terms of technology ‘push’ or market ‘pull’) in 
favour of the ‘reconceptualisation of research as part of increasingly complex, interactive 
and learning-based systems’ (Sumberg, 2005: 24). Significantly, in the case of climate 
change adaptation - and the need for context-responsive solutions and institutions able to 
deliver them -  the AIS framework places greater emphasis than previous models on the 
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importance of appropriate institutional design and evolution and the need to pay as much 
attention to the demand side, as to the supply side of the innovation system.  
 
While the AIS framework is concerned with the enablement of technology development 
and use, in this paper we are concerned specifically with the enablement of adaptation to 
climate change, and of capacity for climate change adaptation, and, by extension, 
technology development that would support these goals. Brooks and Loevinsohn (2011) 
identify the following features of an AIS responsive to food insecurity and climate change: 
(i) ‘recognition of the multifunctionality of agriculture’ (see IAASTD, 2009 for an extended 
discussion of 'multifunctionality') ‘(ii) access to diversity as the basis for flexibility and 
resilience; (iii) concern for enhancing capacity of decision makers at all levels, from the 
bottom up; and (iv) continuity of effort aimed at securing well-being for those who depend 
on agriculture’ (Brooks and Loevinsohn, 2011:186). In this paper we highlight two key 
elements from this framework in particular: Firstly, diversity is a key concept which means 
‘more than mere variety’ of technologies or farm inputs. Rather, it acknowledges the 
heterogeneity embedded in farming systems ‘as it exists in particular places’, in local 
institutions and everyday practices (Brooks and Loevinsohn, 2011:187). Secondly, in 
focusing on capacity the framework emphasises the need for formal institutions at different 
scales to learn from and build on the adaptive capacities of communities and households 
already experienced in living with and adapting to rapid change (cf. Lemos et al., 2007).  
 
This paper explores these inter-related dynamics of scale, diversity and capacity through 
two country case studies in technological change in agriculture: Kenya, ‘in many ways the 
‘poster child’ for Africa’s new Green Revolution’ (Odame and Muange, 2011:78) and 
Malawi, where the contested politics of ‘climate proof’ agriculture pits a popular national 
input subsidy programme against more sustainable alternatives (Chinsinga et al., 2012, 
Javdani, 2012). In each case, and despite national and international policy discourses 
highlighting crop diversification as a favoured pathway to more sustainable farming 
systems and food futures, the effects of the policies and programmes reviewed in this 
paper have been to encourage further dependence on a single crop (maize) and particular 
technologies (hybrid seeds and inorganic fertilisers) purchased (albeit at subsidised rates) 
from networks of private providers (agro-dealers) that have been able to take root in some 
places but not others. This paper argues that such paradoxical outcomes ‘make sense’ 
when placed in the broader context of a thread of continuity that links liberalisation policies 
enacted during the era of structural adjustment with more recent policies and programmes 
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sanctioning a return to direct government intervention, in which, to paraphrase Adger et al.    
(2006) powerful actors have been able to ‘tilt the playing field’, framing the problem in such 
a way as to demand the type of solution that they have to offer. The facilitation of climate 
resilient smallholder agriculture therefore requires, in the first place, a re-examination of 
the (re)emerging orthodoxy and recognition of its limitations and perverse effects, in order 
to create space for the identification of more sustainable alternatives. 
 
On the road to crop diversification? The case of Malawi 
 
Malawi is considered ‘one of the twelve most vulnerable countries to the adverse effects of 
climate change in the world; and this vulnerability is ‘heightened by its excessive 
dependency on rain-fed agriculture’ (Chinsinga et al., 2011:110). In Malawi, 85 per cent of 
the population make their living from agriculture, which accounts for over 90 per cent of 
national export earnings, 39 per cent of GDP and 85 per cent of total employment 
(Chinsinga et al., 2011:110). An integrated national household survey conducted in 2005 
revealed that ‘five out of eight of the most serious shocks [experienced] were agricultural in 
nature. These shocks, in order of severity, include large rises in food prices, lower crop 
yield due to drought or floods, large falls in crop sales, death or theft of livestock, and crop 
diseases or pests’ (Chinsinga et al., 2012:4). It is not surprising, therefore, that debates 
about economic development, poverty reduction and climate change adaptation in Malawi 
converge on the agriculture sector. More specifically, these debates focus on the 
smallholder sector. This is because, while Malawi ‘maintains a largely dualistic agriculture 
sector comprising smallholder and estate sub sectors’, it is the the smallholder sector that 
contributes most to the national economy. ‘It is estimated that the smallholder sector 
accounts for 80 per cent of Malawi’s food production and 65 per cent of agriculture’s 
contribution to the the country’s GDP’ (Chinsinga et al., 2012:4).  
 
The dominant crop in Malawi’s smallholder sector is maize. ‘Overall, an estimated 97 per 
cent of smallholder farmers grow maize, and more than half of households grow no other 
crops.’ Vulnerabilities stemming from dependence on maize tend to be compounded by ‘a 
paradox ... that only 10 per cent of these maize growers are net sellers, with as high as 60 
per cent being net buyers’ (Chinsinga et al., 2012:4). This state of affairs has been 
explained in terms of a vicious cycle called the ‘low maize productivity trap’, in which ‘inter-
year maize price instability’ deters investment in agricultural inputs, so that ‘large amounts 
of cultivated land ... are used for maize production with very low yields, and this depresses 
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land and labour productivity across the agriculture sector and indeed across the whole 
economy’ (Chirwa et al., 2011:8). 
 
There is a growing consensus that crop diversification strategies to reduce maize-
dependence represent ‘a desirable strategy for safeguarding rural livelihoods in the 
context of uncertain climates’ (Chinsinga et al., 2011:112). Crop diversification is seen by 
climate change project planners as a ‘cushion’ against the multiple adverse effects of 
climate change, by farmers as a means to ensure food availability, by district level officials 
as an entry point for improving soil health, and by donors as a ‘means to improve the 
nutritional status of a society deeply wedded to maize food products’. As such, while 
hardly a novel prescription for sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods, efforts to promote 
of crop diversification have been re-energised by a discourse that has ‘extended beyond 
food security to how it can serve as a sustainable [climate change] adaptation strategy’ 
(Chinsinga et al., 2011:112, emphasis added). Nevertheless, major challenges remain, not 
least the political, economic and cultural dominance of maize. The narrative of crop 
diversification for climate change adaptation is thus confronted by ‘the political imperative 
to ensure food security, which is equated with having enough maize at both national and 
household levels’ as well as ‘a strong cultural orientation that equates food with maize’ 
(Chinsinga et al., 2011:112). The following account highlights the inherent contradictions 
and tradeoffs between policies and programmes promoting, on the one hand, on-farm 
diversification, and on the other hand, acceleration of aggregate maize production to meet 
national food security goals. 
 
The imperative to break out of the ‘low maize productivity trap’ and the choice of crop 
diversification as the preferred adaptation strategy converged in the promotion of ‘Malawi’s 
famous input subsidy programme2 ... as a mechanism for facilitating crop diversification’. 
In fact, the decision of aid donors to pledge support was made ‘on the condition that it 
would promote other crops besides maize’ (Chinsinga et al., 2011:112), following its 
successful first year which had been funded in its entirely by the Government of Malawi. 
This decision, by major aid donors, to endorse and financially support a programme (which 
they had initially opposed), represented a break with a long-standing policy orthodoxy 
under which government mechanisms for addressing food security had been ‘dismantled 
under agricultural liberalisation reforms imposed by the World Bank and other agencies in 
                                                 
2
 This programme is alternately referred to as the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) and Agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (AISP). 
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the 1980s and 1990s’ (Devereux, 2009:29) Initially condemned by donors as a market-
distorting measure that would undermine liberalisation, this position was overturned just 
one year later, with Malawi and its subsidy programme being transformed into ‘the darling 
of Green Revolution advocates the world over’ (Chinsinga, 2011:59).  
 
As a means of ‘ushering in a much acclaimed Green Revolution’ and raising national 
maize production, the input subsidy programme has been an undoubted success. ‘Since 
its introduction, Malawi has consistently produced a maize surplus over and above its 
annual requirement estimated at 2.1 metric tonnes’ (Chinsinga, 2011:62). Furthermore, 
while the initial aim was to ‘kick start farmers into using higher yielding hybrid seed and 
inorganic fertilisers’ as a way to break the low maize productivity trap (Dorward and 
Chirwa, 2011), the programme has  also functioned as a social protection mechanism that 
has reduced the need for food aid (Brooks and Loevinsohn, 2011:193). However, ‘the 
input subsidy programme has failed to promote crop diversification even though it was 
designed as such’ (Chinsinga et al., 2011:113). Chinsinga (2011) identifies three key 
elements of the programme which have begun to attract criticism: Firstly, ‘multinational 
companies have ... seized on the apparent success of [the programme] to justify the use of 
hybrid seed’ and to challenge the perception that hybrid maize ... is ‘inappropriate for 
small-scale farmers’. And while the Government’s policy has been to promote improved 
varieties in general - both OPVs [open-pollinated varieties; which can be saved and 
replanted, from one year to the next] and hybrid - ‘there has been a silent switch from 
OPVs to hybrids as the subsidy programme has evolved’ (Chinsinga, 2011:63).  
 
Modes of delivery have favoured private sector actors and mechanisms. Donors, in 
particular, ‘wanted greater involvement of the private sector in both the procurement and 
distribution of subsidised fertiliser and other farm inputs’. Their rationale was that 
involvement of the private sector would facilitate the diversification of the input subsidy 
programme ‘which, in turn, would stimulate progressive and sustainable private sector 
growth and development’ (Chinsinga, 2011:63). In practice, however, a concentration, 
rather than diversification of private provision is underway, with only large companies able 
to absorb the ‘huge transaction costs incurred through voucher redemption’. As a result, 
although the scheme has expanded the demand for improved seeds, this has not led to 
the hoped-for development of a vibrant indigenous seed sector to meet this demand. In the 
event, local seed companies have been unable to exploit the commercial benefits arising 
from the programme ‘because of their reliance on multinational seed companies to 
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process the seeds’. Furthermore, among the multinational seed companies, one provider, 
the Monsanto company, has emerged as the main beneficiary, since it controls more than 
50 per cent on the hybrid maize in the country’ (Chinsinga, 2011:64). 
 
In summary, the failure of the programme to promote crop diversification can be traced to 
the convergence of interests between government, donors and seed companies that 
secured the sustainability of the programme in the long term. Ultimately, ‘while constantly 
making reference to the ideal of crop diversification’ the government’s main preoccupation 
is with food security at the national level, which is it equates with maize security (Chinsinga 
et al., 2011:113, emphasis added). For the government, therefore, ‘food security can be 
guaranteed by the use of high yielding hybrid maize varieties. Seed companies are keen to 
promote hybrid maize seeds since they are their main product’ - which must be purchased 
each season -‘and through the subsidy programme [they] are guaranteed a ready market. 
Donors are interested in promoting a private sector driven supply system ... to fill the 
vacuum following the dismantling of the state-driven supply system through liberalisation.’ 
(Chinsinga et al., 2011:113).  
 
Meanwhile, the success of the programme, and the resulting ‘lock-in’ to a hybrid maize-
based agri-food system, may have obscured important lessons from the 2001/2 famine; 
and therefore prevented the emergence of more sustainable pathways to climate change 
adaption in the longer term (Loevinsohn, 2011). Research by Loevinsohn (2011) has 
shown how, in the more severely affected areas of the country, community level responses 
to some of the worst effects 2001/2 famine are rich in lessons regarding the adaptive 
capacity latent in households and communities. These included, not only farm-based 
adaptation strategies, but also migration, facilitated via familial and informal networks, to 
areas where food could be accessed. In particular, ‘distress migration patterns during the 
famine showed people gravitating towards cassava growing areas, highlighting its role as 
a famine crop’ (Brooks and Loevinsohn, 2011:193). The advantage of cassava is that it 
says in the ground until it is needed. It ‘is a perennial crop, with a 2-4 year productive life 
span, farmers harvest cassava all year round, over a period of years, in small quantities, 
mainly for household consumption. Farmers rely on this safety valve, adjusting their 
cassava harvest upwards in years when the maize crop fails and downwards when the 
maize does well’ (Haggblade et al., 2009:12).  
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Lessons from these household and community-level adaptive strategies might, if not for 
the the singular focus on the role of the input subsidy programme in temporarily plugging 
the food gap - understood as a maize gap -  have informed a very different set of national 
food and agriculture policies. Interestingly, although at the national level maize productivity 
and crop diversification goals were in conflict, these lessons from community level 
responses have informed an innovative - but less well known - regional initiative: ‘Cassava 
Transformation in Southern Africa’ (CATISA) (Haggblade et al., 2009:12). In this case, 
local adaptation strategies have informed the design of a food security planning system 
which employs cassava strategically as a regional ‘buffer crop’ (Brooks and Loevinsohn, 
2011:193, emphasis added). In this way, synergies between regional and local levels have 
been found, in striking contrast with the conflicts that have arisen between encouragement 
of on-farm crop diversification and a national input subsidy programme that has served to 
intensify reliance, not only on maize, but on commercial maize, and the additional costs 
this incurs. This is not to say that cassava is the ‘magic bullet’ in the way that hybrid maize 
is not; or that regional planning is somehow preferable to a national level intervention. 
Rather, it is the provenance (rather than the nature) of the solution - emerging from 
attention paid to ‘latent’ adaptive capacity embedded in patterns of household and 
community-level response - that offers useful lessons for the development and enablement 
of adaptive capacity, at all levels, in the longer term. 
 
A model technology delivery system? The case of Kenya 
 
In Kenya, as in Malawi, agriculture is central to the national economy, so ‘climate change 
is a critical cause for concern’ (Maina et al., 2012:1). Data gathered during the formulation 
of Kenya’s ‘Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture 2004-2014’ highlight the importance of 
agriculture for the country: 80 per cent of Kenya’s population of 34 million live in rural 
areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, while the sector accounts for 26 per 
cent of the GDP and 60 per cent of export earnings (GoK, 2004).  
 
Maize is the most important crop in Kenya, politically, culturally and economically (Brooks 
et al., 2009). It is important both as a subsistence and commercial crop, ‘grown on an 
estimated 1.4 million hectares by large scale farmers (25%) and smallholders (75%)’ (de 
Groote et al., 2005:33). In this context, the decline in aggregate productivity since the mid 
1990s has concerned policymakers and food policy analysts, and confounded 
expectations raised by Kenya’s brief ‘maize Green Revolution’ which peaked and then 
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leveled out in the mid 1980s (de Groote et al., 2005). Since then, aggregate levels of 
maize consumption (estimated at 103kg per person) have steadily exceeded national 
production, so that Kenya has to import increasing volumes of maize to make up this 
shortfall.  The productivity of maize agriculture has therefore become a national research 
and policy priority in recent years (de Groote et al., 2005:33).  
 
As in the case of Malawi, the stagnation of the agricultural sector and the design of 
contemporary responses to it have to be understood against the background of structural 
adjustment reforms imposed during the 1980s by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Odame and Muange, 2011). Thereafter, ‘in 1990, the Government 
continued this reform process by abolishing quotas and licenses and deregulating prices in 
the fertiliser industry’ and ‘in 1996 the seed industry became fully liberalised and an 
autonomous industry regulator, the Kenyan Plant Health Inspectorate (KEPHIS) was 
established’ (Odame and Muange, 2011:79). These reforms, it was hoped, would ‘pave 
the way for a market-based economy, in which the private sector would take over functions 
such as input distribution from the state’. In practice, however, ‘market development has 
been slow, due to capital constraints, complex trade and licensing arrangements and 
restrictive domestic laws in the seed industry’, all of which have hindered adoption of new 
technologies, particularly ‘by poor smallholder farmers, especially in low rainfall areas’ 
(Odame and Muange, 2011:79).  
 
Since then, the last ten years has seen a shift in attitudes towards state intervention in the 
agricultural sectors in SSA, and in Kenya the ‘government is is not about to exit from input 
distribution just yet’ (Odame and Muange, 2011:79). Emboldened by Malawi’s input 
subsidy ‘success story’ and the donor community’s subsequent change of heart, what has 
been referred to as a new ‘African consensus’ has displaced the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
as the received wisdom on the advisability (or not) of government intervention in the 
agricultural sector. The following passage, taken from a speech given by a senior AGRA 
official at a national agriculture conference held in Nairobi in 2008 captures the mood of 
the time, as one era gave way to the next: 
 
Farmers’ get subsidies everywhere except Africa … [In the US and EU] they are 
doing the right thing, so can we also do the right thing? [Referring to structural 
adjustment] no, that is bad economics, that is morally wrong … that kind of policy is 
for the past … in the 1980s we were told by the World Bank, “tighten your belt”, we 
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were told to tighten everything we could tighten … what we need today is not a 
Washington Consensus, we need an African Consensus’.3 
 
In this context, ‘since the mid-2000s, a strong coalition of actors has emerged in Kenya 
with a focus on stimulating a new Green Revolution through the application of new 
technologies, particularly certified seeds and fertilisers’ (Odame and Muange, 2011:79) 
and two parallel national and international initiatives are currently underway - the ‘Strategy 
for Revitalising Agriculture’ (SRA) and ‘Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa’ (AGRA), 
respectively. These initiatives share an emphasis on collaboration between the public and 
private sectors, and the identification of the agro-dealer - a locally-based, private business 
dispensing seed, fertiliser and information to smallholder farmers - as the central actor in 
new input delivery systems (Odame and Muange, 2011). Implicit in the design of these 
programmes is an acknowledgement of the extent of the decline of government extension 
and the difficulty (and prohibitive cost) of rebuilding it. In the new Green Revolution, 
therefore, the agro-dealer becomes the de facto extension officer (Brooks et al., 2009). 
 
These programmes driving the new Green Revolution have, in common with Malawi’s 
input subsidy scheme, adopted ‘an international narrative that identifies low productivity to 
degraded soils and lack of access to modern inputs’ as the ‘national narrative in Kenya’. Its 
wholesale adoption as a national narrative is highly problematic, however, ‘since it ignores 
important regional agro-ecological and socio-economic variations’ (Odame and Muange, 
2011:83). The country is divided into several (variously between six and eight) agro-
ecological zones, ranging from the high altitude, high potential zones in Western Kenya 
and the Rift Valley, the country’s ‘maize basket’, at one end of the spectrum, to the ‘low 
potential’ arid and semi-arid areas to the East and North of the country at the other. 
Similarly, wide socio-economic variations (in terms of land holding, water access, livestock 
numbers and access to regular or irregular off-farm income) differentiate farming and 
livelihood systems within and across these different zones (Kibaara et al., 2009).  
 
These agroecological and socioeconomic variations intersect with impacts of climate 
change and variability in complex and multiple ways (Brooks et al., 2009, Kibaara et al., 
2009). For example, in a recent study of seed systems in Kenya, farmers in the Machakos 
district in Eastern Kenya identified unreliable rainfall, rather lack of access to inputs, as 
                                                 
3
 Akin Adesina, speaking on behalf of AGRA at a conference to review progress in implementing Kenya’s 
‘Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture’ (SRA), Nairobi 11
th
 November 2008. 
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their key productivity constraint. ‘In such areas ... inadequate soil moisture renders yields 
of most crops unresponsive to inorganic fertiliser use and in some cases the fertiliser may 
even harm the crop by burning it’  (Odame and Muange, 2011:83). Furthermore, farmers in 
dryland areas like Machakos traditionally practice diversified farming, as a way to 
spreading risk in uncertain weather conditions as well as to meet dietary needs. Under 
these programmes, however, farmers are incentivised to devote more land and other 
resources to maize cultivation. As a result, they are discouraged from diversifying - their 
tried and tested adaptation strategy - and steered instead towards higher levels of maize 
dependence, and the vulnerability this induces (Odame and Muange, 2011:83).  
 
Meanwhile, a degree of recognition of the ‘basic biophysical constraints’ that present the 
main challenge to agricultural production in dryland areas has led to the initiation (with 
substantial funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) of two major research 
programmes for the development of drought tolerant maize varieties4 (Scoones and 
Thompson, 2011, Brooks and Loevinsohn, 2011). These programmes build on a long 
history of breeding drought resistant maize varieties for Kenya’s dryland regions, starting 
in the 1970s (Heisey and Edmeades, 1999). However, they represent a point of departure 
in that the design of both programmes incorporates the same model of input delivery - 
commercial hybrid seeds and fertilisers purchased from agro-dealers - as programmes 
designed with high potential zones in mind, despite evidence of the limits of this approach 
(Odame and Muange, 2011:86). Odame and Muange (2011) identify a series of 
constraints to agro-dealers’ ability to act as an effective substitute for public extension, 
particularly in drought-prone regions, which include: ‘the uneven geographical coverage 
with relatively fewer ‘legal’ and well-capitalised agro-dealer in the poorer, lower potential 
areas; the focus of delivery on a limited number of seeds and varieties (mostly hybrid 
maize, adapted to medium and high potential areas; the dominance of a few companies in 
the supply chain, with knock on consequences for price competitiveness and technology 
diversity; the limited technical knowledge of those serving in [as opposed to the owners of] 
agro-dealerships; the restrictive nature of regulations, which limits wider competition in the 
local market; [and] underdeveloped infrastructural support, which increases operating 
costs and therefore prices, especially in the low rainfall areas’ (Odame and Muange, 
2011:86). 
 
                                                 
4
 The CIMMYT-led ‘Drought Tolerant Maize for Africa’ (DTMA) http://dtma.cimmyt.org/ and an AATF-
brokered public-private partnership named Water-Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA), both with substantial 
support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation http://wema.aatf-africa.org/ (1 March 2013). 
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Finally, these programmes display a ‘blind spot’ with regard to the role of informal systems 
of seed selection, saving and exchange in ensuring food security in drought-prone regions, 
over the years. In dryland environments, the cost of commercial inputs is prohibitive given 
that a decent harvest, or even a harvest at all, if far from assured. In this context, farmers 
rely on informal seed systems to provide locally adapted varieties that, while perhaps not 
‘optimal’, offer what for smallholder farmers is a more acceptable balance of cost and 
(uncertain) benefit (Brooks et al., 2009). These informal systems have evolved over time, 
through intergenerational transfer of knowledge and expertise and traditions of reciprocity 
and mutual support, as well as continued access to localised crop and varietal diversity. In 
some instances, the role of these systems has been recognised by NGOs acting locally to 
organise seed fairs for the facilitate the exchange of locally adapted seed following periods 
of drought (Orindi and Ochieng, 2005). Furthermore, examples exist of innovative attempts 
to bridge formal and informal seed systems in community-based, on-farm ‘seed bulking’ 
programmes, supported by government scientists and extension agents and using 
improved ‘composite’ materials adapted to local conditions (Brooks et al., 2009:36-37). 
 
Policies and programmes advancing the ‘Green Revolution’ model, on the other hand, 
undermine these informal systems of seed and food security both directly - by setting out 
explicitly to replace informal systems with what are viewed as superior, formal seed 
systems - and indirectly, though the enactment of regulatory systems that marginalise or 
even outlaw the dissemination of seed that has not been subject to full certification (Brooks 
et al., 2009).  Meanwhile, participatory plant breeding methodologies that engage with 
informal seed systems are increasingly marginalised in mainstream crop research (Brooks 
and Loevinsohn, 2011). Here, as was illustrated earlier in the Malawi case, multinational 
seed companies have played a role in restricting options available to farmers, in this case 
by lobbying the government to abandon plans to integrate informal seed systems into 
national seed policies and laws5 (Odame and Muange, 2011). 
 
Conclusion - adaptation, diversity and choice 
 
This article has explored the extent to which efforts to improve productivity of smallholder 
agriculture as part of a new ‘Green Revolution’ in Sub Saharan Africa are likely to enhance 
the capacity of smallholder farmers to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The high 
                                                 
5
 These issues are brought into sharp focus in a short film by the University of Sussex-based STEPS Centre, 
entitled ‘Seeds and Sustainability’ http://vimeo.com/20239062 (1 March 2013). 
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profile interventions that have been examined in this paper share a commitment to a 
model of agricultural modernisation that combines a familiar ‘technical fix’ with a ‘market 
fix’ that casts farmers as discerning consumers of predetermined technologies (Scoones 
and Thompson, 2011:4). These dynamics have been explored through two country case 
studies, Malawi and Kenya. In each case, despite the identification of maize dependence 
as a source of increasing vulnerability in the context of climate change, policy measures 
and programmes intended to increase the resilience of smallholder agriculture are 
reinforcing and intensifying trends which are likely to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities.  
 
In Malawi, an input subsidy scheme introduced with massive popular support has evolved 
from its initial design as a stop-gap measure to ‘kick start’ more productive and diversified 
smallholder agriculture to become an catalyst for concentration in the seed sector and thus 
the erosion of crop and varietal diversity. A key driver has been the articulation, by donors, 
of a contradictory set of conditionalities: on the one hand setting crop diversification as an 
explicit condition for funding; and on the other hand insisting on a private sector driven 
model which has created prohibitive barriers to entry for smaller providers and paved the 
way for an extension of market share by a small number of large companies. In this case, 
an underlying assumption that involvement of the private sector per se would drive crop 
diversification has been proved to be flawed. Rather, a convergence of interests (for 
donors, the promotion of a private sector driven system; for the government, the 
achievement of food security in the short term, and for multinational seed companies the 
acceptance of hybrid seed as an appropriate technology for smallholder farmers) have 
coalesced around a ‘silent switch’ to hybrid maize, and the costs, and risks, this brings. 
 
A similar dynamic can be observed in Kenya, whereby the spread of hybrid maize is 
displacing alternative crops as well as certificated open pollinated varieties (OPVs - which 
unlike hybrids the seeds can be reused the following year) and informal, locally adapted 
varieties of maize. The erosion of biological and institutional diversity embedded in the 
informal seed systems - easier to lose than to replace - is a particular threat to food 
security in drought-prone environments where local seed saving and exchange is the 
norm. In both countries, therefore, cross scale mismatches remain unaddressed: In 
Malawi, the drive to maximise aggregate maize production as the primary route to national 
food security conflicts with and ultimately trumps donor-endorsed policies encouraging on-
farm crop diversification as a climate adaptation strategy. Meanwhile in Kenya, which 
unlike Malawi, is extremely agro-ecologically heterogeneous, the current suite of 
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programmes (even those explicitly addressing biophysical constraints in dryland areas) 
envisage the country-wide implementation of a ‘one size fits all’ input delivery system; 
taken from Kenya’s ‘maize basket’ to the west of the country and replicated in the 
precarious, mixed farming systems in the semi-arid areas of Eastern Kenya, despite 
emerging evidence that such a system is failing to take root in those marginal agricultural 
areas where the need for adaptive technologies is understood to be greatest. 
 
Two related conceptual flaws have been identified in the design of the new generation of 
‘Green Revolution’ programmes, as evidenced in both country cases, with respect to the 
development of community-level adaptive capacity. Firstly, a discourse of ‘consumer 
choice’ for farmers with respect to agricultural technologies misconstrues the very basis of 
on-farm agro-biodiversity on which local adaptive capacity depends (Brooks and 
Loevinsohn, 2011, Brooks et al., 2009). A convergence of public and private sector 
interests in hybrid maize adoption has led to the conflation of market-based ‘variety’ of 
agricultural technologies, as seen ‘from the top down’, with ‘genuine diversity that reflects 
the many dimensions of difference inherent in the heterogeneity’ [that] exists in particular 
places’ (Brooks et al., 2013:159), and which can only be ‘seen’ at the local level and 
developed ‘from the bottom up’ (Brooks and Loevinsohn, 2011).This confusion of diversity-
in-context with market-based variety is further obscured by an enduring tendency (carried 
over from the Asian ‘Green Revolution’, fifty years earlier) to assume interventions based 
on the dissemination of genetically-improved seeds (together with associated inputs) are 
scale-neutral, obviating the need to understand and respond to local diversity and 
complexity (Brooks et al., 2009). Such assumptions endure, not only in relation to 
technology development, but also now the market-based mechanisms though which, it is 
envisaged, these technologies will ‘reach’ smallholder farmers, thus stimulating ‘demand’. 
Ultimately, however, these are supply-driven innovation systems which construct, rather 
than respond to actual demand. Such an approach runs counter to the wisdom that climate 
change adaptation capacity development a) ‘address highly local contexts’ and b) pays 
attention to ‘appropriate institutional mechanisms, in ways that will enable smallholder 
farmers to adapt to the effects of climate change’ (Vermeulen et al., 2012).  
 
The challenges of climate change adaptation, and the identification and development of 
adaptive capacity, are new areas of learning and knowledge generation. Nevertheless, this 
paper has shown that valuable lessons from household and community adaptation ‘in 
highly local contexts’ and drawing on locally ‘appropriate institutional mechanisms’ do 
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exist; as do innovative projects that have been able to learn from them, and apply this 
learning across scales (Loevinsohn, 2011, Orindi and Ochieng, 2005, Haggblade et al., 
2009). The danger is that these emerging lessons, tentative and context-dependent 
though they are, may be overlooked in the rush to put ‘modern’ systems in place, in every 
place. These findings suggest that, rather than focus on the development of new 
technologies and programmes, the priority should be to put in place alternative decision 
making processes (such as those advocated by Ely et al., 2011) that ‘level the playing 
field’ and allow existing and potential approaches that build adaptive capacity ‘from the 
bottom up’ to be considered and appraised alongside those that currently dominate.  
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